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RESTING IN MID-AIR, THE SUPREME COURT
STRIKES THE TRADITIONAL PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGE AND CREATES A NEW
CREATURE, THE CHALLENGE FOR
SEMI-CAUSE: EDMONSON v. LEESVILLE
CONCRETE COMPANY
I. INTRODUCTION
For every lawyer who believes that "most cases are won or lost in
voir dire,"' the peremptory challenge is an essential tool.' Traditionally,
this challenge or "strike" allowed each side to eliminate jury panel mem-
bers without cause or explanation. The skillful use of the peremptory
challenge by both sides contributed to the selection of fairer, more impar-
tial petit juries. In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,3 the Supreme
Court redefined and remade the peremptory challenge. After Edmonson,
the peremptory challenge is no longer truly peremptory. It is, in fact, "a
challenge for semi-cause."4
To create this new animal, the United States Supreme Court held
that whenever any litigant, in any action, criminal or civil, exercises a
peremptory challenge, and the trial judge gives effect to that challenge by
excusing the stricken juror, the litigant's act may be imputed to the state.
Because the state is deemed to have acted whenever a peremptory chal-
lenge is exercised, all litigants, whether civil or criminal, carry the con-
stitutional burdens of state actor status, and may be challenged if a
peremptory challenge is exercised in a facially racial manner. Such an
exercise, the Court holds, violates the equal protection component of the
1. Richard "Racehorse" Haynes, Speech at Mississippi College School of Law (April 16,
1985) (discussing the role of the jury in the American legal system).
2. The peremptory challenge is especially helpful in two situations. First, it may be held in
reserve for those jurors who have been challenged unsuccessfully for cause, on the premise that there
will be residual hostility on the part of the interrogated juror. The second use is basically a "seat of
the pants" exercise where each side eliminates jurors whom it thinks will be inclined to favor the
opponent. This seat of the pants strike is often made on the belief that if a juror belongs to a
particular group, he or she will be predisposed to act like other members of that group. See gener-
ally Barbara A. Babcock, Voir Dire" Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 545-55
(1975).
3. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
4. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308, 1317 (5th Cir. 1988) (Gee, J., dissent-
ing), vacated, 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
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Fifth Amendment's due process clause.5 This tortured attempt to eradi-
cate racism from the courthouse is unrealistic at best. At worst, it consti-
tutes faddish tinkering with the jury trial itself and may lead to the
abolition of the peremptory challenge altogether.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts of the Case
Petitioner Thaddeus Edmonson, a black man, was injured at Fort
Polk, Louisiana on June 18, 1984, while working within the course and
scope of his employment for Tanner Heavy Equipment Co.6 Edmonson
brought a negligence action against Leesville Concrete Co., owner of a
cement truck which pinned Edmonson between the truck and another
trailing piece of road equipment.7
The case came to trial on July 27, 1987, and after voir dire each side
exercised three peremptory strikes. Two of the three jurors struck by the
defendant were black.' All of the jurors struck by Edmonson were
white.9 One black juror was seated on the petit jury. 10 The plaintiff's
lawyer asked the judge to require defense counsel to articulate a race-
neutral reason for striking the two black jurors pursuant to the rule in
Batson v. Kentucky. 1 After reviewing the law, the trial judge denied
plaintiff's request and ruled that Batson did not apply to civil cases."
5. The Fifth Amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
without just compensation.
U.S. CONsT. amend. V. See also Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
6. Edmonson, III S. Ct. at 2080-81; See also Brief for Respondent at 2, Edmonson (No. 89-
7743).
7. Edmonson, II S. Ct. at 2080-81.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 219 (5th Cir. 1990), rey'd, II1 S. Ct.
2077 (1991).
11. Id. In Batson, the United State Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant establishes a
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination when he proves: (1) he is a member of a cognizable
racial group; (2) the prosecutor has used peremptory challenges to strike members of the defendant's
race; and (3) the facts surrounding the exercise raise an inference that the prosecutor used the per-
emptory challenges to exclude members of the defendant's race on racial grounds, from the petit
jury. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).
12. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2081. See also Joint Appendix at 52, Edmonson (No. 89-7743)
(wherein Judge Earl E. Veron was quoted: "I have read the Batson case and I don't, I am unable by
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 27 [1991], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol27/iss2/3
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
The trial judge also found no discrimination in the selection of the petit
jury and seated the jury as originally selected.' 3 Following a trial on the
merits, Edmonson was awarded $90,000.
B. Lower Court Disposition and Reasoning
Edmonson appealed the pretrial ruling denying the application of
Batson to civil actions. A panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
held for Edmonson by a two to one majority and extended the rule in
Batson to civil cases. 5 Writing for the panel, Judge Rubin reasoned that
the case turned on whether the Fifth Amendment 16 applied to the exer-
cise of a peremptory challenge by a private litigant in a civil action or
whether the exercise was a private action not reached by the
Constitution. "7
Judge Rubin began with the proposition that no precise formula ex-
ists for determining state action. 8 After this disclaimer, the court pro-
ceeded to search for significant involvement by the government in the
exercise of peremptory strikes by private parties.' 9 To determine signifi-
cant involvement, the court applied the test for state action as formulated
in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.20
The Lugar test consists of two prongs. Courts must first ask whether
the alleged deprivation is caused by the exercise of a right or privilege
having its source in state authority.2' Next, courts applying Lugar must
ask whether the party in question may be appropriately characterized as
a state actor.22 The Fifth Circuit panel in Edmonson had little trouble
finding that the exercise of a peremptory challenge is a right or privilege
having its source in state authority.23 The more difficult second prong
was also met by the joint participation of lawyer and judge in exercising
any stretch of the imagination to stretch the Batson case to apply to a civil case .... The court finds
there is no discrimination, no violation of the law in the selection procedure.").
13. Joint Appendix at 52, Edmonson (No. 89-7743).
14. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2081.
15. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308, 1313 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated, 895
F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990) (en bane), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
16. See supra note 5.
17. Edmonson, 860 F.2d at 1310.
18. Id. at 1311 (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961)).
19. Id. (quoting Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972); Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967)). See also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
20. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
21. Id. at 939.
22. Id.
23. Edmonson, 860 F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988) which
provides: "In civil cases, each party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges.").
1991]
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and then giving effect to the peremptory challenge.2 4 After denying that
the application of Batson to civil cases would effectively convert the per-
emptory challenge to one for cause,25 the court remanded the case to
determine whether Edmonson could establish a prima fade case of racial
discrimination as outlined by Batson.
In response to the panel majority, Judge Gee dissented, arguing that
no state action could be found in the exercise of a peremptory challenge
by a private party,26 and that the effect of such a ruling would severely
impair the usefulness of the peremptory challenge.27 Judge Gee also dis-
agreed with the majority's inference that striking jurors along ethnic lines
in a particular case implies or gives the appearance of derogatory racial
views.2 8 He observed:
[I] am unable to avoid the conclusion that first the Supreme Court,
with its decision in Batson, and now our panel, with today's case, have
leapt halfway across a logical chasm and come to rest in midair.
What remains after today's holding is not the peremptory chal-
lenge which our procedure has known for decades ....
Referring to Justice Marshall's concurrence in Batson,30 Judge Gee
concluded: "Justice Marshall would dispense with strikes entirely, and
perhaps this will be the final outcome. In this much at least he is surely
correct, that we must go on or backward; to stay here is to rest content
with a strange procedural creature indeed: a challenge for semi-
cause .... 31
On rehearing en banc, the panel opinion was reconsidered and va-
cated, and the district court's ruling as to the inapplicability of Batson
affirmed twelve to four.32 Judge Gee wrote the opinion for the majority
in which he tracked his previous dissent. He restated that the exercise of
a peremptory challenge along ethnic lines by a private litigant does not
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1314-15 (noting that the peremptory challenge can still be exercised for any reason,
"however capricious or whimsical, save to violate the Fourteenth Amendment: it may not be exer-
cised to exclude a prospective juror because of race").
26. Id. at 1316 (Gee, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 1315 (Gee, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 1316 (Gee, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 1316-17 (Gee, J., dissenting).
30. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
31. Edmonson., 860 F.2d at 1317 (Gee, J., dissenting).
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involve state action or call into question the fairness of the legal system.33
The United States Supreme Court granted Edmonson's petition for a
writ of certiorari to decide whether a private litigant in a civil case must
articulate a race-neutral reason for a peremptory challenge when an op-
ponent makes out a prima facie case of racial discrimination.
III. HISTORY OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
A. Early History
The peremptory challenge has been used for hundreds of years. It
was an integral component of criminal jury trials in ancient Rome where
the accused and the accuser would each propose one hundred jurors.
Each side then exercised fifty strikes, leaving one hundred jurors to try
the case.34 At early common law, the prosecutor was allowed to exercise
an unlimited number of peremptory challenges. 35 This right led to "infi-
nite delayes and danger," according to Coke,36 and was eliminated by
statute in 1305.37 The defendant's right was preserved, however, and was
identified by Blackstone as a "provision full of that tenderness and hu-
manity to prisoners, for which our English laws are justly famous. '38
Although the 1305 statute stripped the prosecutor of his peremptory
challenge, an alternative practice developed which enabled prosecutors to
shape the petit jury without resorting to a challenge for cause. After
1305, prosecutors were allowed to "stand aside" a juror until the entire
panel had been examined and the defendant's strikes used. If the petit
jury was not complete at this point in the process, the jurors who had
been asked to stand aside were recalled and the prosecutor required to
show cause why the recalled jurors should not be seated.39
While the peremptory challenge was considered primarily a criminal
defendant's tool, the English practice of allowing prosecutors to stand
33. Id. at 219.
34. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 119 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting WILLIAM
FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 75 (1852)).
35. EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; OR
A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON § 234:156.b [p] (15th ed. 1794), cited in Swain v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 202, 213 (1965).
36. Id.
37. Ordinance for Inquests, 33 Edw. 1, Stat. 4 (1305), reprinted in part in Swain, 380 U.S. at
213.
38. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 353 (15th ed.
1809), cited in Swain, 380 U.S. at 212 n.9.
39. Swain, 380 U.S. at 213 n.l1. See also Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thir-
teenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L.
REv. 1, 10 n.11 (1990).
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aside jurors was continued in some American colonies.' In 1790, Con-
gress provided thirty-five peremptory strikes to the citizen accused of
treason and twenty strikes to citizens accused of other capital crimes.41
In 1865, Congress resurrected the prosecutor's right to a peremptory
challenge by allowing five strikes against the defendant's twenty in capi-
tal cases, and two against the defendant's ten in noncapital felony
offenses. 42
B. Post Civil War
After the Civil War, peremptory strikes were widely used to elimi-
nate black men from jury service, not due to any trial-related considera-
tions, but simply because blacks were thought to be unfit to serve on any
jury.43 It has been argued by at least one commentator that this past
abuse of the peremptory strike marks it as an incident and badge of slav-
ery, and therefore unconstitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment."
C. Strauder v. West Virginia
Strauder v. West Virginia45 was decided twelve years after ratifica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 41 In Strauder,
the United States Supreme Court held that a West Virginia statute47
40. JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT To
REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 148-49 (1977) (noting South Carolina, Georgia and Pennsylvania per-
mitted the stand aside practice).
41. Act for Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9, § 30, 1 Stat. 112
(1790). See also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 214-15 (1965).
42. Act to Protect All Citizens in their Civil and Legal Rights, ch. 86, § 2(v), 13 Stat. 500
(1865).
43. Colbert, supra note 39, at 12.
44. See generally id. In Strauder v. West Virginia the Court stated:
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied by a statute all right
to participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of their color, though they
are citizens, and may be in other respects fully qualified, is practically a brand upon them,
affixed by the law ....
100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879).
45. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
46. The Fourteenth Amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
47. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305. (quoting 1872-1873 W. Va. Acts 102 which provides in relevant
part: "All white male persons, who are twenty-one years of age, and not over sixty, and who are
citizens of this state, shall be liable to serve as jurors, except as herein provided.").
6
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which made black men ineligible for grand or petit jury service was un-
constitutional.48 Although the Court held that no person could be ex-
cluded from jury service on account of race, it also warned that the
question before the Court was not whether a defendant had a right to a
jury composed, in whole or in part, by members of his own race.4 9
D. Swain v. Alabama
In 1965, the Supreme Court reviewed the case of Robert Swain, a
nineteen year old black man sentenced to death for the rape of a seven-
teen year old white girl.5" No black person had served on a criminal petit
jury in Talladega County, Alabama for more than ten years prior to the
Swain trial, although two blacks served on the grand jury panel of thirty-
three that indicted Swain.51 The Swain Court affirmed Strauder as the
analytical starting point and reiterated that although a black defendant is
not entitled to a jury containing other blacks, a state's purposeful or de-
liberate exclusion of blacks from participation as jurors in the adminis-
tration of justice violates the equal protection clause.52 The Court then
examined the Alabama system of calling potential jurors, including the
"struck-jury system" employed in capital cases.53 The Supreme Court
found the roots of this system in "ancient" common law and noted that
the struck jury system was generally fairer to both sides and an efficient
way to obtain an impartial jury. 4
After a lengthy discussion of the origin and purpose of the peremp-
tory challenge,55 the Court refused to hold that the striking of a black,
"in any given case," amounted to a violation of the equal protection
clause.5 6 The Court did address a broader claim, however, and reasoned
that if a prosecutor employed an across the board policy to strike blacks
48. Id. at 303.
49. Id. at 305.
50. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
51. Id. at 231.
52. Id. at 203-04.
53. Id. at 210. In the struck jury system, the parties begin with 100 jurors in a capital case.
After excuses and challenges for cause approximately 75 remain. The remaining 75 are then
"struck." That is, the defense strikes two and the prosecutor strikes one until the panel is reduced to
12. Id.
54. Id. at 217-18.
55. Id. at 212-18.
56. Id. at 224.
1991]
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in every circumstance, then "giving even the widest leeway to the opera-
tion of irrational but trial-related suspicions and antagonisms, ' 57 the pur-
pose of the peremptory challenge would be perverted.5 8 This reasoning
was later fleshed out to require criminal defendants to show that a prose-
cutor had systematically used the peremptory challenge to exclude blacks
over a period of time.59 The practical effect of this requirement was crip-
pling, since few defendants could muster a record of past panels and
strikes sufficient to show anything more than "irrational but trial-related
suspicions and antagonisms."'  In affirming the Alabama Supreme
Court and upholding the conviction, Justice White, writing for the ma-
jority, concluded that Swain had failed to meet his burden of proof.61
E. Batson v. Kentucky
In April of 1986, the United States Supreme Court lessened the bur-
den of proof required by Swain.62 James Batson was accused of burglary
and receipt of stolen property. 63 Following voir dire, the prosecutor
struck all four blacks on the jury panel.64 Defense counsel promptly
moved to have the jury discharged, claiming that his client's Sixth 65 and
Fourteenth Amendment 66 rights had been violated.67 The trial judge de-
nied the motion and Batson was convicted by an all-white jury.68
The Batson Court, like the Swain Court, began its analysis with
Strauder. The Court stated that even though a statute may not be dis-
criminatory on its face, if the procedures implementing the statute oper-
ate to exclude persons from the jury panel on the basis of race, the statute
57. Id. at 223-24.
58. Id. at 224.
59. Id. at 227.
60. Id. at 224.
61. Id. at 226.
62. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
63. Id. at 82.
64. Id. at 83.
65. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the following rights:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been com-
mitted; which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
66. See supra note 46.




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 27 [1991], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol27/iss2/3
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
is unconstitutional. 69 The Court then restated that the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may not be contravened by the
exercise of a right not specified in the Constitution, that is, the peremp-
tory challenge.7" The significance of Batson did not, however, rest in the
restatement of old principles.
The real impact of Batson came when Justice Powell lifted the crip-
pling burden of proof required under Swain,7 which had been broadly
interpreted to mean that a defendant must prove the repeated exclusion
of blacks over several trials to make out a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion. 2 The Court held that a defendant may establish a prima facie case
of racial discrimination solely on the basis of the prosecutor's exercise of
strikes at the defendant's trial.73 Under the Batson standard, a defendant
need only show membership in a cognizable racial group, that the prose-
cutor exercised peremptory challenges to exclude members of the defend-
ant's race from the petit jury, and that the circumstances surrounding the
exercise of the prosecutor's challenges raise an inference that the strikes
were made on the basis of race.74
Once a prima facie case is made under Batson, the prosecutor must
come forward with a race-neutral explanation for the strikes.75 The pros-
ecutor's explanation need not rise to a level that would justify a challenge
for cause,76 but it must be more than a good faith denial of discrimina-
tion or a simple assertion that the excluded juror would be partial to the
defendant because of their shared race.
The new evidentiary scheme did not go far enough for Justice Mar-
shall. He argued that the Court's decision would not end racial discrimi-
nation in the exercise of peremptory challenges. That goal, according to
Marshall, could only be accomplished by eliminating peremptory chal-
lenges entirely.78 In Marshall's view, the new framework could be and
would be subverted by the conscious and unconscious racism79 of prose-
cutors and judges who would find it difficult to distinguish "seat-of-the-
69. Id. at 88.
70. Id. at 91.
71. Id. at 92-93.
72. Id. at 92.
73. Id. at 97.
74. Id. at 96.
75. Id. at 97.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring). See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987).
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pants" instincts8° from actual racial prejudice in offering and evaluating
race-neutral reasons.
Chief Justice Burger and future Chief Justice Rehnquist did not
agree with the majority reasoning either, but for different reasons. In
dissent, Chief Justice Burger predicted that voir dire would certainly be-
come more difficult as lawyers would require jurors to state their race for
the record, which in turn would require continuous monitoring of the
panel composition, "present and prospective."8
F. Holland and Powers
Since Batson was decided, the Supreme Court has dealt with several
issues left unresolved by the original decision. In Holland v. Illinois,2
the Court was confronted with a white man convicted of rape seeking to
have his conviction overturned because blacks were peremptorily
stricken from his jury panel. Justice Scalia, joined by Justices White,
O'Connor, Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist affirmed the conviction
and held that Holland did not have a valid constitutional challenge based
on the Sixth Amendment, which does not prohibit the prosecutor from
striking jurors on the basis of race or on the basis of innumerable other
generalized characteristics."3
Although the Court refused to incorporate Batson into the Sixth
Amendment, the narrow holding, coupled with Justice Kennedy's con-
curring opinion, provided an alternate route for future litigants and fore-
shadowed the basis on which Edmonson would prevail. Justice Kennedy
agreed with Justice Scalia that the fair cross section requirement of the
Sixth Amendment was not violated, but Justice Kennedy clearly stated
that if Holland had argued that exclusion via a peremptory strike based
on race violated the juror's Fourteenth Amendment rights, the case
would have been decided five to four in petitioner's favor.84
Accordingly, on April 1, 1991, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices
White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor and Souter confirmed
80. Batson, 476 U.S. at 138 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 130 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also People v. Motton, 704 P.2d 176, 180 (Cal.
1985). Chief Justice Burger criticized the California Supreme Court's attempt in Motton to "finesse"
the problem of the subjective appearance of an excused juror as belonging to a minority racial group
versus the juror's actual and verified descent, and whether it was possible to make a record of"coun-
sel's subjective impressions" on this subject. Batson, 476 U.S. at 130 n. 10.
82. 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
83. Id. at 487.
84. Id. at 488 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
[Vol. 27:203
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that a criminal defendant need not be the same race as the juror peremp-
torily excluded to bring a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment's
equal protection clause. In Powers v. Ohio,"5 the prosecutor used six of
his nine peremptory challenges to exclude blacks.86 Each time a black
was struck, Powers objected on Batson grounds.87 Each time, his objec-
tion was overruled. Powers was convicted on two counts of aggravated
murder, one count of attempted aggravated murder, and firearms viola-
tions.88 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, tracked his concurrence
in Holland, reversed and remanded. 9
Predictably, Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented.
Calling the majority's decision a clear departure,90 the dissenters noted
the obvious shift in emphasis from the right of the defendant to the right
of the excluded juror.9' The dissent also noted that the necessity of racial
identity between the defendant and the excluded juror had been a major
component in the Batson analysis, but had been largely ignored by the
majority.92 On a larger plane, the dissent attacked the majority's view
that a peremptory strike stigmatized and dishonored the excluded group
and inflicted an "injury in fact" on the litigant necessary to assert third
party standing.9 3 Justice Scalia also denied that the case involved a mere
clarification of Batson.94 He wrote:
The sum and substance of the Court's lengthy analysis is that, since a
denial of equal protection to other people occurred in the defendant's
trial, though it did not affect the fairness of that trial, the defendant
must go free. Even if I agreed that the exercise of peremptory strikes
constitutes unlawful discrimination (which I do not), I would not un-
derstand why the release of a convicted murderer who has not been
harmed by those strikes is an appropriate remedy.
85. Ill S. Ct. 1364 (1991).




90. Id. at 1377 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91. Id. Justice Scalia notes that "[o]n only two occasions in the past have we considered claims
by a criminal defendant of one race that the prosecution had discriminated against prospective jurors
of another race." Id. at 1376. Those two cases were Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990), and
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972). In Peters, a white defendant alleged denial of due process and
equal protection because segregated jury lists effectively excluded blacks from his grand and petit
juries. Although Peters prevailed six to three, the case did not produce a majority decision and no
justice relied on the petitioner's equal protection claims, preferring his due process claim and "strong
statutory policy" contained in 18 U.S.C. § 243 (prohibiting disqualification of jurors on racial
grounds). Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1376.
92. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1376.
93. Id. at 1378.
94. Id. at 1381.
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... Today's supposed blow against racism, while enormously self
satisfying, is unmeasured and misdirected. If for any reason the State
is unable to reconvict Powers for the double murder at issue here, later
victims may pay the price for our extravagance. Even if such a trag-
edy, in this or any case, never occurs, the prosecutorial efforts devoted
to retrials will necessarily be withheld from other endeavors, as will the
prosecutorial efforts devoted to meeting the innumerable Powers claims
that defendants of all races can be relied upon to present-again with
the result that crime goes unpunished and criminals go free.95
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DISPOSITION OF EDMONSON V.
LEESvILLE CONCRETE CO.
In Edmonson,96 the issue was no longer whether criminals would go
free and crime go unpunished when a challenge was found to be racially
motivated. Instead, the Court considered whether race-based peremp-
tory challenges in a civil context could be fairly imputed to the state and
thereby prohibited. The majority noted from the outset that the Consti-
tution's protections against infringement of individual liberty and equal
protection applied in general only to action by the government. 97 To
determine whether the acts at issue fell within the sphere of state action,
the Court employed the two-prong Lugar test and determined that the
first prong was easily met. 98 The exclusion resulted from the exercise of
a right or privilege having its source in state power.99
The second prong required a lengthier analysis. To determine
whether Leesville Concrete could be fairly characterized as a state actor,
the Court considered three factors: (1) whether the actor relied on state
assistance and benefits,"° (2) whether the actor performed a traditional
state function,101 and (3) whether the injury was aggravated in a unique
way by the incident of state authority." 2
In considering these factors, the Court claimed that without the
assistance of the trial judge, the peremptory challenge would simply not
be given effect and that Leesville Concrete relied on and benefitted from
95. Id. at 1381-82.
96. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co,, 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
97. Id. at 2082 (citing National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191(1988)).
98. Id. at 2083 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1870).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2084.
101. Id. at 2085.
102. Id. at 2087.
[V/ol. 27:203
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this assistance.10 3 Second, the Court held that the selection of jurors was
a unique state function delegated in part to private litigants and that any
discrimination in the selection was a "direct result of government delega-
tion and participation."'04 Finally, the Court found that the incident of
discrimination was aggravated by the simple fact that it occurred and
was permitted in a federal courthouse.10 5
Having determined that state action was present, the Court held by
a six to three vote that even in civil litigation, race-based exclusion vio-
lated the equal protection rights of the challenged jurors. 0 6 Not surpris-
ingly, Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority, as he had in Powers. Once
again the majority allowed a petitioner to press the equal protection
rights of the excluded juror.1 7 To overcome the general rule that a liti-
gant cannot base a claim on the legal rights of third parties, 00 the Court
held:
[A] litigant may raise a claim on behalf of a third party if the litigant
can demonstrate that he or she has suffered a concrete, redressable
injury, that he or she has a close relation with the third party, and that
there exists some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or
her own interests. All three of these requirements for third party
standing were held satisfied in the criminal context, and they are satis-
fied in the civil context as well.' (9
More specifically, the Court found a concrete redressable injury in
the discriminatory exercise of a peremptory challenge." 10 The second re-
quirement for avoiding the general rule was met in voir dire, according to
the Court, when the excluded venireperson and the party challenging the
exclusion established a bond of trust."' The third and final requirement
for invoking the exception to the general rule was met by the barriers a
challenged juror inevitably confronts in protecting his or her own inter-
ests in serving as a juror, including the impracticality of initiating a
lawsuit.1 2
According to the Court, the primary value served by the extension
103. Id. at 2084.
104. Id. at 2087.
105. Id. at 2088.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1370 (1991).
109. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2087.
110. Id. at 2088.
111. Id. at 2087.
112. Id. (citing Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1373).
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of Batson/Powers to the civil arena is the elimination of racial discrimina-
tion and stereotyping in the selection of the petit jury. 13 According to
the majority, the "quiet rationality of the courtroom makes it an appro-
priate place to confront race-based fears or hostility by means other than
the use of offensive stereotypes. '1 14
V. ANALYSIS
Although the Court's politics may be correct, the Edmonson deci-
sion is flawed. The Court has simply decided that the selection of a fair
and impartial jury is less important than the rights of jury panel members
not to be excluded on the basis of stereotypes, especially racial stereo-
types. Having made that value judgment, the Court unfairly character-
izes every litigant as a state actor when exercising peremptory challenges.
The broad application of state actor status fails to take into account fun-
damental differences between civil and criminal litigation and the real life
impact the extention of equal protection guarantees will have on jury
selection generally.
A. Implementation of the State Action Doctrine
At various times the court has reiterated a commitment to "sifting
facts and weighing circumstances" when approaching the question of
state action. 115 This case by case analysis has generally boiled down to
deciding whether there are enough state connections to a challenged ac-
tivity to bring that activity within the confines of the Constitution's equal
protection guarantees, even when that activity is performed by a private
party. 116
According to Professors Nowak and Rotunda, this sifting of facts
and weighing of circumstances approach does not, at least in theory, take
into account the relative values of the challenged practice and the char-
acter of the complainant's rights. 17 Nowak and Rotunda have suggested
that the Court will not find state action when it wants to protect the
challenged practice, but will find state action when it wants to find a
Constitutional violation.11 This balancing of values theory may account
for the leap the Court makes in Edmonson to find state action. Clearly,
113. Id. at 2088.
114. Id.
115. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
116. JOHN NOWAK & RONALD ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 483 (4th ed. 1991).
117. Id. at 484-85.
118. Id. at 485.
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the Court values the right of the civil litigant or criminal defendant to
exercise a true peremptory challenge less than the right of jurors not to
be excluded on the basis of racial stereotypes. Yet, the Court did not
reason in terms of relative values, preferring instead to maintain at least
the illusion of finding significant involvement by the state.
The dichotomy between state and private action is obviously very
complex. Admittedly no bright line separates the two spheres. 119 Yet,
the lack of a bright line does not mean there are no lines at all. In the
absence of bright lines, it is helpful to remember the rationale for state
action doctrine. The state action doctrine protects against state en-
croachment on constitutional liberties, whether attempted directly or
through the agency of private individuals. The state action doctrine also
recognizes a sphere of individual action that, although repugnant to the
majority, is simply not fairly attributable to the state, and therefore not
proscribed by the Constitution.
To determine whether there is state action, the Edmonson Court em-
ployed the two-pronged Lugar test, which provides a general framework
within which facts are sifted and circumstances weighed. To satisfy the
first prong, the Court held that since Congress provided the peremptory
challenge, 20 the constitutional deprivation resulted from the exercise of
a right or privilege having its source in state authority. 2' The second
prong required a more significant inquiry to determine whether the pri-
vate party charged with the deprivation could be fairly characterized as a
state actor.122
B. Assistance and Benefits
To satisfy the second prong of Lugar, the majority considered three
factors. First, the Court examined the extent to which the actor relied on
governmental assistance. 121 In weighing this factor, the Court magnified
the role of the trial judge in giving effect to the litigant's peremptory
challenge and found that the litigant had benefitted and been assisted by
the court and the court's rules.' 24
Undoubtedly, private parties do benefit from the availability and
119. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308, 1311 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated, 895
F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990) (en bane), rev'd, Ill S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
120. See 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988).
121. See Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2082-83.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2084.
124. Id. at 2084-85.
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functioning of the courts and court procedures; yet, in citing Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority,12 the Court must have considered a nar-
rower meaning of assistance and benefits. Burton involved a whites only
restaurant.1 26 The restaurant was built and maintained on state prop-
erty, and the state received considerable rent from the operator. 127 The
Court held that the restaurant operator could be fairly characterized as a
state actor.1 28 Certainly the tenant who discriminates while occupying
government property and drawing much of his livelihood from govern-
ment workers cannot be allowed to escape the stricter constitutional
standards carried by a state actor. The operator is obviously assisted by
and benefits from his contact and identification with the state.
In contrast, the assistance and benefit a lawyer and his client derive
from a judge during the exercise of peremptory challenges is of an en-
tirely different character. As a general practice, prior to Edmonson,
when a lawyer exercised a strike the judge was not consulted. The law-
yer did not consider whether the strikes would be allowed. The judge's
function in giving effect to the lawyer's exercise was assumed to be purely
ministerial. The lawyer was presented with a panel, a panel list, and
perhaps an opportunity to conduct voir dire. The lawyer then exercised
his strikes in the best interests of the client. 129 The other side did the
same. Each side presented the judge with the names of the stricken ju-
rors and the judge seated the first twelve (or six) beyond those
challenged.
This procedure, like every other rule of court, is designed to benefit
the system as a whole, not the lawyers, the Judge or the parties individu-
ally. Surely, each actor in a trial will benefit from a functioning legal
system, but this broad benefit is radically unlike the individualized and
specific benefits realized in Burton, where the assistance flowing between
the state and the operator of the restaurant could truly be labeled symbi-
otic.130 Although the courthouse and its procedures are inseparable from
the practice of law itself, as Justice O'Connor notes in her dissent, riding
a bus is not converted into state action merely because the government
has built the road and provided public transportation. 131
125. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
126. Id. at 716.
127. Id. at 720.
128. Id. at 725.
129. See infra note 148. See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1
(1980).
130. Burton v. Willimington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961).
131. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 . Ct. 2077, 2090 (1991).
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C. Traditional Government Function
The benefits and assistance factor did not conclude the Court's in-
quiry. The second factor considered was whether the action in question
involved the performance of a function traditionallly performed by the
government.1 32 Justice O'Connor reminded the Court in her dissent that
"challenges are not a traditional government function; the tradition is
one of unguided private choice."' 133 Nevertheless, the Court stated:
In the jury-selection process, the government and private litigants
work for the same end. Just as a government employee was deemed a
private actor because of his purpose and functions in Dodson, so here a
private entity becomes a government actor for the limited purpose of
using peremptories during jury selection. 134
This analysis is startling in more than one respect. First, and most
obviously, the government and private litigants in a civil case do not
work for the same end. The private litigant has little interest in obtaining
a jury that is neutral and unbiased. This is only the minimum he hopes
for. The goal of the civil litigant is to win, and his peremptory strikes are
exercised to that end. The rights of the panel members have, up to now,
played no part in the decision to strike. Additionally, the judge's func-
tion in giving effect to the peremptory challenge, prior to Edmonson, was
considered purely ministerial. But it is not only the judge's role that has
become muddled in the wake of Edmonson.
Polk County v. Dodson 135 involved a public defender acting within
the course and scope of her employment. The Supreme Court held that
she was not a state actor during the time she represented a criminal de-
fendant, though at other times, presumably when performing administra-
tive tasks, she reverted to state actor status. 136 Leesville Concrete, in its
briefs to the Court, relied heavily on Dodson for the proposition that if a
public defender is not a state actor, surely a private civil lawyer cannot be
either. 3 7 The Edmonson majority distinguished Dodson on the basis of
adversity. The public defender is adverse to the government whereas the
private civil litigant usually is not. 38 From that distinction, the Court
moved to the heart of its state action theory. That is, since the selection
132. Id. at 2085.
133. Id. at 2093.
134. Id. at 2086 (citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981)).
135. 454 U.S. at 312.
136. Id. at 324-26.
137. Brief for Respondent at 4,-Edmonson (No. 89-7743).
138. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2086.
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of jurors is a traditional government function which has been delegated
to private parties, the exercise of a peremptory strike by a private litigant
can be fairly imputed to the state.139
One can only wonder under such reasoning how lawyers will keep
track of their status during the course of a lawsuit. It is conceivable that
a private party may be characterized as a state actor during voir dire,
revert back to private status for opening statements before being trans-
formed once more into a state actor when evidence is offered. If private
lawyers are in fact state actors while exercising strikes, the Court must
make clear what is expected and what is permissible in jury selection, and
to whom the primary duty is owed: the client, the summoned panel mem-
bers, or perhaps the public as a whole.
D. Aggravated Injury
Finally, the Court considered a third factor and asked whether the
injury was aggravated in some unique way by the incidents of the govern-
ment's authority."4 The Court dispensed with this factor rather quickly
by stating that the physical location of the alleged deprivation, a court-
room, compounds the insult of being excluded from a petit jury on ac-
count of race. 141
After considering these three factors, the Court concluded that the
second prong of the Lugar Test had been met, and Leesville Concrete
Co. had become a state actor while exercising strikes. 142 Therefore, Lees-
vile Concrete Co. was required to rebut Edmonson's prima facie case of
racial discrimination with a race-neutral rationale. 143
E. Distinguishing Civil Challenges
Under Batson, and now Edmonson, a lawyer striking by the seat of
his pants will no longer have the freedom to exclude jurors of any identi-
fiable class or cognizable group without factoring in equal protection
guarantees. This is acceptable and fair in the criminal context when fo-
cusing on the rights of the defendant, where, as Justice Scalia wrote, "it is
intolerably offensive for the state to imprison a person on the basis of a
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2087.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2088.
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conviction rendered by a jury from which members of that person's mi-
nority were carefuilly excluded."'"
There can be no doubt that a prosecutor is a state actor. Because he
is said to embody the will of the state, he has a unique goal. His aim is
not necessarily to convict. 45 He can claim victory whenever justice is
done.146 Since the prosecutor's aim is justice and because he embodies
the will of the state in a criminal trial, it has been suggested that the
prosecutor should be held to a higher standard in his dealings with citi-
zens than is required of citizens when they deal with one another. 47
Therefore, in the criminal context, it is sound public policy that requires
the state to avoid even the appearance of across the board racial discrimi-
nation in the exercise of peremptory challenges.
This high standard should not and cannot be realistically imposed
on the civil litigator or criminal defense attorney. They cannot be said to
embody the will of the state. The civil litigator or criminal defense law-
yer has a different goal, different duties, and a different standard with
regard to public perception. Their goal is to win.'48 Their loyalties are
to their clients, and their duty is to pursue the clients' goal in a fair and
ethical manner. 49 The public expects no less, and no more.
F. The Effect of Edmonson on Voir Dire
It is offensive and dehumanizing to be simplified and classified on
the basis of limited information, such as skin color. Yet, when a lawyer
exercises a peremptory strike, especially in a court where voir dire is con-
ducted by the judge, that is often what happens. To move beyond racial
stereotypes in the exercise of peremptory challenges, lawyers should be
allowed at least the opportunity, time and freedom to question each pro-
spective juror individually.'5 0
144. Powers v. Ohio, Ill S. Ct. 1364, 1381 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
145. "The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict, but to see
that justice is done." CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 5 (1908). See also MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 3.8 cmt. 1 (1990).
146. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 225 (5th Cir. 1990) (en bane), rev'd, 111
S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 226. "It is the first imperative of the civil advocate to see that it is his side that
wins.... Within the limits of fair and ethical conduct, his sole concern is, quite properly, that his
client gain the case." Id.
149. Id.
150. Although it may be unrealistic in many cases, five minutes per juror, per lawyer, would
amount to an eight hour day, including lunch (assuming a panel of forty jurors). This is not an
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In federal practice, the judge normally conducts voir dire. 5 I The
primary justification for judge conducted voir dire is speed. Althoughimportant, this benefit may be illusory and perhaps insignificant, espe-
cially when weighed against the values served by Edmonson. In current
practice, there is generally not enough opportunity for lawyers to move
beyond the information contained in jury qualification forms, so there is,
by necessity, more reliance on superficial grouping and predetermined
ideal juror profiles.
In some states voir dire is still conducted primarily by lawyers. 52
In such states, there is a greater opportunity to move beyond stereotypes,
including racial stereotypes. Yet even in states where voir dire retains its
"wonderful power,"15 3 it is an imperfect instrument. Even when lawyers
are given the freedom to conduct extensive voir dire, there is often not
unreasonable "front end" investment considering the likelihood of error and appeal under the new
Edmonson scheme.
151. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide:
The court may permit the parties or their attorneys to conduct the examination of prospec-
tive jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the latter event, the court shall permit
the parties or their attorneys to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as it
deems proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such additional questions of
the parties or their attorneys as it deems proper.
FED. R. Civ. P. 47(a). The Northern District of Oklahoma is typical of most United States District
Courts in its implementation of FED. R. Civ. P. 47(a). LOCAL RULE 22 OF THE U.S. DIST. CT. FOR
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA provides: "The Court will conduct voir dire and counsel
will be given the opportunity to suggest additional questions to the Court." See also FED. R. CRIM.
P. 24(a) which is essentially identical to FED. R. Civ. P. 47(a).
152. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provide mandatory instructions to the jury panel that
includes some education as to the purpose of voir dire:
The parties through their attorneys have the right to direct questions to each of you con-
cerning your qualifications, background, experiences and attitudes. In questioning you,
they are not meddling in your personal affairs, but are trying to select fair and impartial
jurors who are free from any bias or prejudice in this particular case.
TEx. R. Civ. P. ANN. r. 226(a) APPROVED INSTRUCTIONS 1(4) (West 1988). See generally WALTER
E. JORDAN, TEXAS TRIAL HANDBOOK § 74 (1981 & Supp. 1989). Compare Oklahoma District
Court Rule 6 which states:
The judge shall initiate the voir dire examination of jurors by identifying the parties and
their respective counsel. He may outline the nature of the case, the issues of fact and law to
be tried, and may then put to the jurors any questions regarding their qualifications to
serve as jurors in the cause of the trial. The parties or their attorneys shall be allowed a
reasonable opportunity to supplement such examination. Counsel shall scrupulously guard
against injecting any argument in their voir dire examination and shall refrain from asking
a juror how he would decide hypothetical questions involving law or facts. Counsel shall
avoid repetition, shall not call jurors by their first names or indulge in familiarities with
individual jurors, and shall be fair to court and opposing counsel.
RULE 6 FOR THE DISTRIcT COURTS OF OKLAHOMA.
153. Babcock, supra note 2, at 545. The author offers insight into the workings of voir dire
generally and the function of the peremptory challenge within that framework. She argues that the
peremptory challenge serves not only to create a fair and impartial jury by eliminating extremes, but
also "avoids trafficking in the core of truth in most common stereotypes." Id. at 553.
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enough information to employ anything more than seat of the pants intu-
ition and instinct. If a negative stereotype has not been dispelled or
countered by a smile or body language or perhaps a brief verbal ex-
change, it will probably be relied upon. This reliance is a system's cost
that cannot be realistically eliminated and must be balanced against the
usefulness of the peremptory challenge itself.
The new peremptory challenge will force lawyers to articulate
"hunches" '154 in open court. In doing so, voir dire will certainly become
a very different experience for all concerned. Whites will be forced to
account for conscious and even unconscious racism. Blacks will deal
with similar questioning designed to confirm, for the record, that they are
being struck because they may resent, consciously or not, the general
subjugation of their race, and may, for instance, favor a black tenant over
a white landlord. Much that was left unsaid or left to hunches will be
ventilated. Perhaps racial tension will be dissipated in some small way,
but the function of voir dire is not to improve relations between races,
men and women, or different religious groups. The function of voir dire
is to uncover real bias and allow for the selection of an impartial petit
jury.
The new practice of articulating neutral reasons will not reduce big-
otry and increase respect for the legal system. It will have the opposite
effect as lawyers routinely meet Edmonson challenges with any number
of stock unverifiable race-neutral reasons. An increased use of the chal-
lenge for cause will inflict far more humiliation than the unfettered per-
emptory challenge. The jury that survives the new voir dire will not be
fairer, more able to work together, or more willing to see other points of
view. It will be Balkanized.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is no longer acceptable, according to the Supreme Court, to strike
blacks because they are black, or by extension, Jews because they are
Jewish, or women because they are women, or Irish Americans because
they are Irish Americans, or poor people because they are poor. There
must be something else. There must be a reason that does not take into
account race, religion, sex, national origin or economic status.1 55 Law-
yers are no longer free to rely on a hunch when exercising a peremptory
challenge. If the hunch is challenged, it must be explained.
154. Irving Younger, Unlawful Peremptory Challenges, 7 LrrIG. 23 (1980).
155. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 124 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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Obviously things are bound to become very complicated as jury se-
lection becomes the hyper-technical exercise pleading used to be. No
doubt those who manipulated the old rules will manipulate the new rules
as well. Lawyers will learn a new language that will mask the same old
reasons for striking blacks, Jews, women, Irish Americans or poor peo-
ple. Perhaps nothing will change. It is conceivable that the new rules
and the new language will do very little, if anything, to eradicate what is
a basic component of human nature: the tendency of every sub-group in
this melting pot we share to favor its own-at least when the question is
close.
The Edmonson doctrine may raise the consciousness of a few on the
important issues of discrimination and stereotyping. This increased con-
sciousness will not, however, translate into fairer juries, or even the per-
ception of fairer juries. It may, in fact, have the opposite result if
implementation of the doctrine causes legislatures to respond to judicial
frustration and a clogged system by simply abolishing the peremptory
challenge altogether.'56 If and when this occurs, our legal system will
have discarded a valuable tool, at considerable cost, in return for a very
uncertain, if not chimerical, benefit.
Bill K. Felty
156. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2096 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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